"You may fly over a land for ever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clear of life, but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."

Theodore R Fahrenbach - This kind of War; A Study in Unpreparedness, 1963.

The race against terrain and time

The above remarkable statement by Farenbach, a historian of the Korean War proven beyond doubt repeatedly in numerous wars, campaigns and battles, major and minor alike during last five decades. The final episode of war against LTTE in Sri Lanka is no exception. It is quite true that present day campaigns are more or less a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, paramilitaries and civil authorities. But, finally or rather at the end, the infantrymen are the one who have to do the dirty job of physically clearing, mopping up and giving the final touches to the battle in order to bring an absolute end to a war. The final days of the Humanitarian Operation in Sri Lanka where LTTE was cornered to a small strip of land called Puthumathalan, and when all other means of use of force i.e. airstrikes, naval gunfire support, use of armor and indirect fire and even the conduct of information operations (i.e. psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, computer network operations and public affairs, civil-military operations etc) were restricted due to tactical, technical and ethical reasons, infantry has to moved in, close up with the LTTE and had to destroy them.

First, I should mention here at the beginning, that this article is neither a scholarly research nor an account of how the terrorism was militarily defeated in Sri Lanka. This is purely a collection of thoughts of a person in civilian perspective, albeit with little military background, but with rather historic as well as contemporary militaristic approach and touch to the contents. Next, I should state that neither I have any intention of criticizing anyone nor praise a particular service, regiment or an individual. Therefore, individuals mentioned in this article remain anonymous except for eminent international scholars and leaders whose works are quoted here in verbatim. This is just a recounting of certain events which changed the course of 30 year conflict in Sri Lanka.

There were lot of blind spots, ambiguity and vagueness about the final days at Puthumathlan. The general public is inquisitive and wants to know exactly what happened at Puthumathlan. One has to understand that at the height of the battle, especially amid close quarter fighting where LTTE directed fire at advancing armed forces taking cover of over 100,000 civilians, there always happen to be certain gray areas of which nobody keeps a record and nobody wants to review at a later stage. The end of Fascist regime in May 1945 and last days of Saddam's dictatorship in May 2003 painted the same haziness where no accurate records of the final events are available. The fighting at Puthumathalan was the climax of the campaign and most difficult and critical moment for both armed forces and LTTE. All odds were against the fighting troops and troops had to face the extremely complex/volatile situations and multidimensional challenges. The complexity was amplified by presence of civilians, configuration of the battlefield (sea to the east, lagoon to the west, water canal to the south and small, almost bare land strip to the north), sandy terrain, harsh weather, combat fatigue, mounting casualties, repeated counter attacks / human wave attacks by LTTE and internal (from the government, political parties, general public and military hierarchy) & external (international community) pressure. Accordingly, the reader has to understand the setting of the battlefield as well as omnipresent residue of fighting. The residue is always death and destruction which brings misery and carnage. No one was able to prevent or change the ultimate outcome of events. Dues ex machina of LTTE never materialized in this isolated piece of land. In this context the Puthumathlan battle is rather a story of a race against terrain and time as much as a battle against LTTE.

It was alleged that military used excessive force and thereby set civilians life at risk, the same civilians LTTE used as a human shield. One of the main principles of Law of Armed Conflict is "military necessity" and it accepts the realities of war and allows the use of whatever reasonable force is necessary during an armed conflict to make the enemy submit. In that sense, what the government declared 'No Fire Zone (NFZ)' within "Puthumathalan Enclave" should have been better termed either as a safety zone/neutralized zone/demilitarized zone or a non-defended locality. When these zones or localities meet certain conditions it can enjoy special protection under Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols. In my view "Puthumathalan NFZ" not fulfilled the criterion required to be termed as one of above, hence could not be categorized under any of these. General Rupert Smith, former NATO Deputy Supreme Commander Europe, a person with vast personal experience in Gulf War, Bosnian, Kosovo and Northern Ireland conflicts in his recent book "The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World" explains the complexity and reality of actions of warring parties in a situation similar to this. He says, "Once at war the adversaries, whilst expected to obey the Conventions, do not have to play by the same rules of the game; indeed much of the generalship involves arranging to play on a pitch, in a style and to rules that suit your side and disadvantage the other. Furthermore, and all other socially acceptable behavior except some sports, wars and fights are not competitions: to be second is to lose." Though I mentioned here for readers' interest, these two facts alone should not be taken as a justification for use of excessive force. The way military maneuvers to encircle LTTE along with over 100,000 civilians at Puthumathalan and number of soldiers killed and wounded during the last three months of the encirclement itself will speak against the argument of use of excessive force. It also highlights the effort taken by military to reduce non-combatant casualties.

Puthumathalan was a battlefield where two heavily armed opposing parties fought with one another, in fact the most decisive battle of the 30 year's conflict. What encompass a battlefield? Andrew J Bacevich, in his book The New American Militarism explains the battlefield and soldiers as "..from time immemorial, the battlefield had been a filthy, stinking place. Combat had obliged soldiers to exist in the damp and the mud, at times amidst blood and decay, with lice and flies and rats as their frequent companions. Preparing soldiers to encounter this environment had traditionally involved an emphasis on stress and deprivation. Whether in war or in peace, soldiering had been a dirty, exhausting business, in which rest, clean cloths, decent food, and bathing tended to figure as something of an afterthought." This was the state of affairs during April/May 2009 at Puthumathalan too where a decisive battle for victor or vanquished took place. It was a decisive battle hence destructive too. Whether the parties used air, indirect fire (artillery / mortar) or heavy weapons is irrelevant as far as the destruction is concerned (we mostly argued on the number of lives and not the material destruction). Modern small arms in the hands of skilled soldiers and if properly employed can cause similar destruction as opposed to indirect fire with its sophistication, accuracy, operating speed and kinetic energy. Therefore we have to understand the realities of war, the hardships and its inherent destruction which is universal and inevitable.

There was an article in 'The Island' newspaper by a retired Major General which later appeared in Ministry of Defence website with the title "Why Could We Not Defeat LTTE for 25 Years." The General clearly explains the main reasons for failure as political involvement and senior officers' irregularities along with host of other reasons. Whilst accepting his causes for failure, I would like to reinforce it with few additions which the reader has never thought of.

Apart from what the Major General pointed out about inefficiencies of few senior officers (I reiterate the word few), it is not that they were ineffective as such, but they were - or at least in retrospect appeared to have been -too smooth, too clever and too detached from real soldiers and real soldiering. They had the difficulty of putting military theory into practice. Though all officers are equally educated and trained one should not expect same level of performance from all of them. Some have inherent talent or rather a flair for formulating strategies and skill for executing major campaigns, whereas some does not. As one of my colleague, who has a vast knowledge on the history of the conflict, rightly pointed out, most of these senior officers had a sense of duty, but not the sense of belongingness.

That is why they failed. However, the failure should not be a reason for castigation. There were instances in the history where senior officers were summarily executed for their failures. The best example was the execution of Admiral John Byng of the Royal Navy. He has been tried and executed for his blunder in 1756. In oppose to this, Major General Moshe Dayan, Israel's Chief of Defence Staff and one time Minister of Defence argues in his autobiography 'The Diary of the Sinai Campaign' argues that "A military command is not a duty which every citizen must fulfill, nor is it a privilege to which everyone is entitled. The supreme function of a unit commander is to lead it in battle, and if he does not stand the test he should not be punished, but he should be replaced by someone who does."

In Sri Lanka Army, we have seldom seen replacing of commanders during the last 25 years but, it was very frequent during last 2 1/2 years of the conflict (2007-2009). But this inefficiency is neither characteristic nor endemic to Sri Lanka and not limited to Sri Lanka Army too. Brigadier Robert H Scales (Jnr) of US Army in his book "Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War" describes how some commanders of the US Army performed during the Gulf War, "...Some officers were reasonably well trained in the scholastic art of 'drawing arrows on a map'. Yet these same officers had no idea how to make soldiers perform at the points of the arrows". There also have been number of instances in the recent past where strategies were forced on commanders by the politicians. This we should not take as granted as though their (commanders') hands were tied, they were not gagged; but none spoke against such enforced strategies. In nutshell what happened in the past was that some politicians along with few influential military commanders and civilians in powerful positions, without identifying the end state and the center of gravity, engineered a strategy which was later forced on military. The result was; in many cases armed forces have been deployed to contain the LTTE but the armed force has not been properly employed.

However, at the end the armed forces were blamed for their ineffectiveness but no effort was taken to find out the reasons for ineffectiveness. Is it lack of political will, inefficiency of senior military officers, lack of resources, training, morale or all of these? It is well known that the very basic fact of a successful campaign is "Unity of effort", i.e. integration of political, military and public will to fight. It was not evident in the past. The result was, in effect, to send the armed forces off to fight while leaving the country behind. It was the Armed Forces' war and armed forces alone were responsible for its conduct. Whilst the successes of the military were shared between influenced, the soldiers were blamed for failures.

As once General H Norman Schwarzkopf said about Vietnam War "we had drafted young Americans, ordered them to fight, and then blamed them for the war when they came home...we all remembered feeling abandoned by our countrymen." Similarly the members of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces were often blamed for ineffectiveness and they were abandoned, forgotten and neglected. Their contribution, bravery, heroic actions, sacrifices were not recognized. How many young men sacrificed their lives/limbs since 1981 through 2006?

Haven't they contained the LTTE with all the odds and constraints? In the recent past the military, especially the lower ranks were neglected, not given due recognition and practically considered as a burden to the country and as a social segment that consumed taxpayers' money for nothing. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Americans during post-Vietnam era i.e. 1970s and 1980s. President Ronald Reagan addressing the nation at the ceremony to present the Medal of Honour to Master Sergeant Roy P Benavidez in 1981 stated that "...we brought home a group of American fighting men who had obeyed their country's call and who fought as bravely and as well as any Americans in our history. They came home without a victory not because they'd been defeated, but because they'd been denied permission to win.....They were greeted by no parades, no bands, no waving of the flag they had so nobly served. There's been no 'thank you' for their sacrifice. There's been no effort to honor and, thus, give pride to the families of more than 57,000 young men who gave their lives in that far away war." The phrase applicable to us is that "they had been denied permission to win". They had been denied permission to win by their own countrymen.

The other reason the war took 25 years to finish is that some people had refused even to countenance an all out effort to destroy LTTE, placed whole kinds of LTTE targets off-limits, and signaled military weakness through periodic "pauses in combat operations" and political weakness through negotiations or peace talks. Together, these had made the campaign longer. Politicians and civilians had intruded where they didn't belong and decided things they had no business deciding. In fact the whole country, the government, armed forces and general public together followed an open-ended policy to war i.e. go to war with no end state. The bottom line is Carl von Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity" i.e. the state, the military and the people were responsible for the prolong conflict.

It is near impossible for a military force to attain results without no 'end state' or clearly defined aim. I wish to quote General Smith again, "...without an aim firmly linked to the political purpose it is difficult to use force to advantage, because the commander does not know what outcome or effect must be achieved in order to support the achievement of the overall political purpose".

Since each of these three elements (Remarkable Trinity) is equally crucial for a successful campaign, one cannot blame the politicians and generals alone for all the blunders in the past. The nation as a whole is responsible for failures. Pointing fingers at individuals may not be the right thing to do at this juncture. Fortunately, the country understood the needs of the hour i.e. they clearly identified the end state, value of unity of effort and priorities and most importantly the right combination of political, military and civilian actors who has a sense of duty, sense of belongingness and resilience to withstand pressure; simply the right persons to take the lead.

The journey to victory

No war is to be welcomed, least of all by those who fight them. But if the Sri Lanka Army was destined to fight a war with the LTTE, the timing of the combination of unwavering political-military leadership along with nation's response and commitment to eradicate terrorism in 2006 could not have been more opportune. The infantry heavy response to LTTE act of aggression culminated in an extraordinary victory, liberating vast patches of jungle oligarchy from the clutches of a megalomaniac possessed of a large army similar to that of a conventional army with lethal arsenal and ruthless tactics along with human bombs.... But this war didn't take two and half years to win; it took over two decades of disillusionment and anguish, over two and half years to build up confidence and finally certain victory at Pudumathalan. The victory is not an offer. It was gained and achieved. The path was sustained innovation on a massive scale: new doctrine, sophisticated new weapons, more rigorous approaches to training and development of leaders, large-scale changes to military organizations and tactics, forming and reforming of new institutions like Civil Defence Force (CDF) and State Intelligence3 Service (SIS) - all developed over a period of two years.... But it proved that given proper training and adequate personal (resources), the soldiers can accomplish its mission. Also for the first time in this conflict Sri Lankan armed forces took the strategic initiative to their hands, thereby inherent advantages of the same, hence battles were fought at the time and the place of armed forces' choosing. Due to the flexibility and advantages gained from strategic initiative the military traded time for space and vice versa as and when required.

There were no deadlines, calendar targets or halfhearted "do something operations", but at the same time the strategists have realized that Sri Lanka cannot sustain a bloody, ambiguous, costly, protracted war. Military revolutions did not happen overnight. They took time to mature and required far-reaching, expensive, and frequently painful institutional changes. In short, soldiers must recognize that to save their profession they must change it, either taking the initiative to do so on their own or submitting to change imposed from outside. The Government and the Army were compelled to implement changes, but at the same time they were willing to take the risk of change. It is common human psychology that every human being hates change or fear changes. Officers and soldiers are not an exception. But senior officers feared it most and Eric L Haney has to say this in his book "Inside Delta Force" "...As a rule, armies hate change-and no one hates change more than the ones who have benefited most by the status quo: the general officers. Now and then, innovative thinkers do happen to wear stars on their collars,...".

However, changes were implemented but with much criticism from various circles within and outside the Army. The change occurred not only within the Army, but in other services and within civilians too. The change occurred not only in infrastructure and material but in the doctrine and concepts too. As Donald Rumsfeld, once US Secretary of Defense put it "Transformation is about an awful lot more than bombs and bullets and dollars and cents; it's about new approaches, it's about culture, it's about mindset and ways of thinking of things." With reluctance officers, soldiers and general public accepted the changes which transformed the Army gradually towards a more professional army and finally to achieve its (Sri Lanka Army's) mission i.e. "To provide internal and external security to the entire country deploying armed forces in order to safeguard independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, suppress riots, commotions and to assist the civil administration to continue supplies and services essential for public life in emergencies". Though most are not heard of the mission of the SL Army (and mission itself need slight changes now), this was the focus of all changes. Soldiers took from last 25 years the lesson that it made no sense to fight unless you were willing to "go all out to win" and the nation supported that.

The Commander of the Army headed the endeavor, backed up by an impressive coterie of brigadiers and colonels who realized the need for total reform: of the Sri Lanka Army, of its officer cadre and of its operations. Most importantly they understood the need of change of doctrine and concept of operations. Gen Smith stated that "Navies and air forces are equipment driven: they are organized and evolve as their equipment demands and technology dictates. The organization of the armies, on the other hand, tends to reflect the geography and nature of the societies from which they are drawn." So the strategists understood that when it comes to use of military force mere superiority will not suffice, hence the doctrine and concept of operations has to be changed to suit the contemporary threat i.e. the LTTE and requirement of confronting the LTTE in the jungles of Wanni. The organization of battle (ORBAT), training, tactics, and equipment were modified, or rather revolutionized according to the threat. A final change to the Sri Lanka Army structure was the suspension of the system of promotion through age/service in an attempt to introduce meritocracy in the ranks. Ability and professionalism became the defining attributes. As a result, the new divisions, brigades and battalions quickly came to be commanded by young and talented commanders.

Public response

In public life today, paying homage to those in uniform has become obligatory and the one unforgivable sin is to be found guilty of failing to "support the troops". How this tendency developed over a period of short time and inculcated in the society? Whose brainchild is this? Who was instrumental and invented this wonderful Sinhala word "Sagaya" (Buddy) to address the common soldier and how fast it embedded in the peoples' day to day life. Military service did earned a respect as a recognized profession in 1950s and 1960s in Sri Lanka, but due to various incidents related to youth insurrection in 1971, it lost its fame and remained same since then. Recovering from 1971 setback was not easy but it gained a fairly good reputation again in late 1970s and early 80s, but the conflict in north and east demanded what the Army is not trained or prepared to do, hence failed frequently and lost its fame gradually. For all incidents the "Remarkable Trinity" blamed the Army in general and the individual officers/soldiers in particular. They did not understood that "...the soldier is not chiefly a military figure; he is primarily a social figure. He is influenced by his home, his upbringing and historical traditions. He is a soldier only because military training has imposed a certain fixed pattern of behavior upon him. The soldier is, in fact a citizen of the nation" (source unknown). They did not understood that it is a futile effort to segregate soldiers from the society.

It is common in every society that soldiers and soldiering is respected and recognized, if not worshiped as persons with dignity and as a noble profession respectively. Over and above irrespective of individual soldiers' ethnicity, caste, social status or education, profession of soldiering is considered as a revered profession in most of the countries. That caused to consider soldiering as a noble profession. In some countries like Pakistan soldiering is a noble profession whilst in Saudi Arabia it is more or less a prestige to become an officer. In Sri Lanka it was the wealthy who became officers whilst youth from less influential joined as other ranks. But when the conflict became intense in mid 1980s it was basically the rural youths who joined the military. The situation in USA during 1960-1985 was same and 'The New York Times' once reported that "While the nation's wealthy and more educated youth have shunned the military, minorities and the underprivileged, along with the offspring of the officer class, have picked up the slack". Situation in Sri Lanka in 1980-2008 is more or less similar to that. As families of influence often reluctant to send their sons to the army, sons and daughters of the common citizen had to fill the void.

Soon after the Independence, in early 1950s Sri Lankans had recognized a link between citizenship and military service and military profession was considered as a privileged status in Sri Lankan society, but the conflict in north and east, all but severed that relationship and even middle-class citizens, although admitting deep regard for soldiers, tend to admire soldiers from a safe distance. This was clearly evident within Colombo citizenry. Timely activated state sponsored recognition and wide media coverage along with considerable monetary, material benefits to soldiers make headway, and gradually transformed the mindset of the country. Stunning and spectacular military successes in the Eastern Province and regaining of Thoppigala, which considered to be an impenetrable fortress of LTTE, triggered the public interest, which integrated the state, military and people together into the "Remarkable Trinity". Thus repeated requests to general public and assurance of certain victory transformed the whole country into a single mighty force which wholeheartedly supported the war effort. In fact this mighty force was behind every single victory during the campaign.

The prospects

The Battle was won, but not the war. Conflicts are resolved, but not necessarily confrontations. All of those who prophesied that out of war would come lasting peace, were either misguided or far away from reality. Whilst battles may have a sharp end to its fighting, the end of a war is always blurred. Those who cry for withdrawal of Army from north and east may have a valid reason as everybody likes to enjoy 100% freedom devoid of Army. The fighting is over. So why still the Army in north and east? Send them back to barracks. In military jargon this is called "Recovery Stage". General Smith in his "The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World" says that "There should be an old adage that says: 'Don't send out a force you can't get back.' The ability to return a force is integral to its successful use -though it must be emphasized that the decision to return the force always lies with the political level, even if all military objectives have been successfully attained.......recovery is no less important since it implies finishing a job and thereby either leaving at a successful end or else finding a replacement." One should not mix-up 'recovery' with the word 'withdrawal'. Recovery involves the de-induction of a large force from a theatre of operations at the end of a war or a campaign (whether it's successful or not) whilst withdrawal is a tactical operation where a force disengages with enemy after a battle. Recovery involves large forces as observed in Pacific and Europe after WW II, Korean War, Vietnam War, Russians pulling out from Afghanistan and Gulf War I (Operation Desert Storm) and few other campaigns. Common features of all these wars/campaigns are first; all are interstate (cross border) force deployments hence international in nature. Second; the whole force was never de-inducted and always there was a residue of sizeable force which remained in country despite furious opposition from various quarters. However, exception was the Vietnam where de-induction was clearly visible and no one remained after de-induction. This all campaigns (except WW II) could be considered as a result of military metaphysics (A tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military means).

The military in north and east of Sri Lanka is neither an international force nor an occupation force. It conforms to post conflict residue common to every conflict. To be fair for both opposing perspectives, it could be now considered as a policing force of the future development partner of that particular area. This may be also appropriate to other parts of the country too. Let me take you back to the history of occupation force. This is what General Dwight D Eisenhower (Commander- Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force - SHAEF) told to his staff officers in 1945 when Germany is divided between three occupying forces, "the success of this occupation can be judged fifty years from now. If the Germans at that time have a stable, prosperous democracy, then we shall have succeeded". Has his prophesies come true today?

A respectable reader in his article "Relax Security Checks Now" at Opinion Letters Column of "The Island" paper on 07 July 2009 has requested to relax certain security restrictions enforced during the last 2 years. One has to understand that we are still a country at risk. Our security forces have to be successful all the time to prevent LTTE attacks, whereas LTTE only have to be successful once to create havoc in the country.

The government, military including intelligence organizations can never gain sufficient information to fully anticipate future threats. We need not despair, but we must incorporate these realities into our security policy as we develop strategies. The defence of an island must be highly adaptive, preparing for the widest possible range of contingencies. Every citizen has to give away some of your freedom and privacy for safety and security. It is a compromise. How much should we sacrifice? It is my belief that our civil liberties or freedom should be curtailed, to the extent that the benefits in greater security outweigh the costs in reduced liberty. Security is always a shared responsibility. Equal portion of that responsibility lies with the average citizen of the country. One has to understand the importance of government encouraging and empowering citizens to play an active role in safety and security of general public, like the highly effective program as "Vigilant Committees", a joint venture of Police and community. Basically, it's like a sort of formalized neighborhood watch program. And it really has the community acting as the eyes and ears of the Police. This was highly effective not only during a conflict but to curtail day to day crimes too. Further, it linked the distancing Police-Community relationship. However, we have to realize that no matter how much threat prevention is done, some disasters cannot be stopped. Therefore, we should not be complacent about security and better to be on the qui vive for anything.

I would like to conclude this article by thanking the "Remarkable Trinity" for bearing all hardships amidst taking flak from every corner. The credit goes to everybody. Namely to persons who have make it a reality by leading the battle, the leaders. But, isn't it better to share the credit.

"A leader is best

When people barely know he exists,

Not so good when people obey and acclaim him,

Worse when they despise him.

But of a good leader, who talks little,

When his work done, his aim fulfilled,

They will say:

We did it ourselves."

         - Lau-tsu (6th Century BC Chinese) `